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Commentary
Lawrence J. Chrisfiano
iiijftuthe Pagan and Robertson article pre-
sents auseful review of the evidence
ii on the empirical status of the liquidity
effect proposition—that an exogenous
increase in the money supply drives the
rate 01 interest down. It discusses how the
consensus in the empirical literature has
shifted from an initial one of skepticism to
what Pagan andRobertson call ‘the new
view”: that the liquidity effect proposition
has substantial empirical support. In my
comment, I offer an alternative perspective
on the evolution ofthe empirical hterature,
one which focuses on the dynamic correla-
tions between three monetary aggregates
and the federal funds rate.
A valuable contribution of the Pagan and
Robertson article is to document evidence to
suggest that the liquidity effect may have
gotten smaller in the years since 1982. This
is an important observation which deserves
more attention to determine exactly what it
means. It may simply be a statistical artifact,
reflecting the relatively small amount of
information in the post-1982 data. Assessing
this is complicated by the fact, documented
further below, that most ofthe evidence of a
change reflects sub-sample variation in the
estimated variance-covariance matrix ofvector
autoregression (VAR) residuals. AsPagan
and Robertson note, these residuals appear
to be characterized by autoregressive condi-
tional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) effects and,
under these circumstances, it may be difficult
to identify a true change in an unconditional
variance-covariance matrix. But, assuming
that the changein the vaciance-covariance
matrix of VAR residuals is in fact real, then
this raises further interesting questions of
interpretation: Has the liquidity effect in fact
gotten smaller, or is the evidence ofareduction
an artifact ofan error in the specification of
monetary policy? The calculations that pro-
duce evidence ofa change in theliquidity effect
assume there has been no change in monetary
policy Mostcommentators on Fed policy think
that there wasa shift in policy in late 1982.
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I begin my discussion by defining what
Imean by a liquidity effect, which I take to be
a property ofan economic model. Aneco-
nomic model possesses a liquidity effect ifit
has thefollowing characteristic: An exogenous,
persistent, upward shock in the growth rate of
the monetary base, engineered by the central
bank and not associated with any current or
prospective adjustment in distortionary taxes,
drives the nominal rate ofinterest down for a
significant period oftime.
This definition of the liquidity effect can
be distinguished from the traditional, partial-
equilibrium liquidity effect in theliterature.
That refers to the fall in the interest rate that
is required by a downward-sloped money
demand schedule when the money supply
increases and there is no change in the price
level and level of income. Many existing
general-equilibrium models that do not
possess aliquidity effectin the sense that I
define it do display apartial-equilibrium
liquidity effect.
The basic question addressed in the Pagan
and Robertson article,and in the empirical
liquidity effect literature, is: What do the data
say about the relative plausibility of the fol-
lowing two types ofmodels: models with a
hquidity effect and models with theimphcation
that an exogenous increase in the monetary
base drives the nominal rate of interest up?
The reason why this question is
interesting is that the answer one selects
has important implications for the construc-
tion ofquantitative macroeconomic models
with money This is discussed further in
Christiano (1991) and Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1995).
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Notes: Data ore quarterlyand cover the period 1959: 1-1991:4. Money data have been logged,
and both series hove been HP-filtered prior to doing the computotions.
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(Examples include King, 1983; Melvin, 1983;
and Mishkin, 1983). This had an impact on
the development of monetary business cycle
models, For example, Barro (1987, p. 521)
and Robert King (1991) cite these findings as
evidence in support of the firstwave ofmone-
tized real business cycle models. These models
have the implication that an exogemous
increase in money growth, ifpersistent, leads
to a rise in the nominal rate ofinterest, Now
the consensus has returned to the traditional
position in favor of liquidity effects. This in
turn has sparked efforts to identify frictions
which allow monetary models to display a
liquidity effect.
3 45678 A case cam be made that this evolution
in thinking reflects early analysts’ tendency
to focus exclusively on broader monetary
aggregates and their tendency to ignore the
sources ofendogeneity in money To gain
UUPUUUI4I insight into the role played by these consid-
hvavus~vu~rtu erations, consider the results reported in
Figures 1-3, taken from Christiamo and
Eichenhaum (1992). They display the cross-
correlation between different monetary aggre-
gates and the federal funds rate (black line),
together with plus-and-minus one standard-
deviation confidence bands (blue line). The
monetary aggregates examined include non-
borrowed reserves (NBR), the monetary base
(MO) and Ml. Both the interest rate and the
monetary aggregates have been logged and
Hodrick-Prescott filtered prior to the compu-
tations, 0 The data display three key features:
(1) The broad monetary aggregates covary
positively with current and future values ol
the interest rate; (2) rtcgatively with pastvalues
of the interest rate; and (3) NBR covaries
negatively with current and future values of
the interest rate.
In view ofthe first feature, it is perhaps
not surprising that analysts who assumed the
endogenous component ofmoney is small
and focused on broader monetary aggregates,
arrived at the view that the evidence does not
support an important liquidity effect. Early
research which recognized the potential role
of endogeneity took the view that the Fed
conducts monetary policyby targeting the
nominal interest rate, (See, br example,
Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; and Sims, 1986.)
Under this view, exogenous innovations in
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Historically, economists have taken the
plausibility of the liquidity effect for granted.
This is reflected in standard intermediate
macroeconomics textbooks, which feature
models exhibiting liquidity effects. However,
when researchers initially attempted to quan-
tify the liquidity effect using data, they caone
away quite skeptical as to its plausibility




base growth engineered by the central bank
are associated with innovations in the interest
rate. Feature two ofthe data helps explain
why these analysts favor the liquidity effect
view that an upward revisionin the Fed’s
interest rate target is implemented by engi-
neering a reduction in the money supply
Finally, beginning with Thornton (1988),
researchers have recently begun working
with NBR. In light of feature three, it is
perhaps not surprising that they have tended
to conclude that the evidence favors theliq-
uidity effect view.
While the correlations Ijust described
go a long way toward explaining why different
researchers reached different conclusions about
the empirical status ofliquidity effects, they do
not tell the whole story. That isbecause the
liquidity effect pertains to the sign of thecor-
relation between the components of interest
rates and money that reflect exogenous dis-
turbances to monetary policy Raw correla-
tions, by contrast, reflect thejoint movements
ofinterest rates and money arising due to
the effects of all shocks, notjust exogenous
monetary policy shocks. To see why this dis-
tinction probably matters, consider thecor-
relation between logged and detrended gross
domestic product and NBR in Figure 4,2 The
fact that the contemporaneous correlation is
significantly negative may reflect a policy of
“leaning against the wind” at the Fed. Ifso,
then the raw correlation between interest rates
and NBR reflects in part the response ofboth
variables to whatever shocks are driving GDE
Such shocks could in principle produce a
positive or negative correlation between money
and interest rates, independentof whether the
liquidity effectis operative.
Coleman, Gilles and Labadie (1995), CGL,
present a couple ofhypothetical examples that
illustrate very nicely how- this couldhappen.
The examples underscore the importance of
isolating the exogenous monetary policy
component of amonetary indicator variable.
They are also useful for illustrating the kind
of steps researchers take in practice to build
confidence that the shocks they have isolated
are indeed monetary policy shocks and not
something else, Inone of CG12 examples, the
economy is driven by a single shock, one that
is non-monetary’ in origin. CGL assume that
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Notes: See notes to Figure 1.













Both voriobtes were logged Notes: Data ore quarterly and cover the period 1959: 1-1991:4.
ond HP-filtered prior to the connpuototions.
the shock drives up the equilibrium nominal
rate of interest, and that this produces an
accommodation at the Federal Reserve’s dis-
count window. The Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) is assumed to partially
offset the impact of this on total bank reserves
by undertaking contractionary open market
operations which have the effect of reducing
nonborrowed reserves. Inan economy like
this, there would be anegative correlation
between the rate of interest and NBR, even
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Notes: Impulse response based on l
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Notes: Impulse response function hosed on six-log, six-variable VAR estimoted for period
1982:12-1991:10, Confidence interval is the one implied by the l4-lag, six-vorioble VAR
fit to whole somple.
though there are no monetary policy
shocks at all.
CGI~second example illustrates how
an economy with monetary policy shocks,
but only an anticipated inflation effect and
no liquidity effecr, could also generate a
negative correlation between nonhorrowed
reserves and the interest rate. Suppose the
Fed signals policy shifts in advance ofactually
implementing them, and that asignal ofan
imminent increase in the growth oftotal
reserves produces an immediate rise in the
interest rate. Suppose the rise in the interest
rate results in an accommodation at the dis-
countwindow, so that to insulate total reserves
from this, the Fed must reduce nonborrowed
reserves. In aworld like this, one would
expect a negative correlation between non-
borrowed reserves and the interest rate, even
though there is no liquidity effect.
It is in an effort to avoid the sort of
pitfalls illustrated by the CGL examples that
the recent literature has taken great pains to
isolate the exogenous component of monetary
policy in monetary indicatorvariables. The
assumptions made to do this are called iden-
tif3iing assumptions, and they typicallyinvolve
incorporating more variables into the analysis.
Additional steps are taken to further reduce
the likelihood of the kind of problems empha-
sized in the CGL examples. One strategy for
doing so is pursued in Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (1994), CEE. Tobuild confidence
that their shocks correctly isolate theexoge-
nous shock to policy, CEE analyze the impact
of their monetary policy shock measures on
many macroeconomic variables. Based on
their findings, they conclude that their mon-
etary policy shockmeasures probably do not
suffer significantly from the sort of distortions
illustrated in the two CGL examples. For
example, it seems unlikely that the CEE policy
shock really measures the private economy
shock in CGI~first example. That’s because
CEE find that a negative shock to nonbor-
rowed reserves leads to a rise in unemployment
and inventories, and a fall in output, employ-
ment, profits, and the broad monetary aggre-
gates. It seems hard to imagine areasonable
model in which anon-monetary shock would
have these effects. Finally, CGIIS second
example seems implausible in light ofthe CEE
finding that a negative shock to NBR leads to
a fall in the broader monetary aggregates.
In sum, the basic outlines of the story
describing the evolution of thinking about
liquidity effects can be understood with ref-
erence to simple correlations between various
monetary aggregatesand theinterest rate. The
fullstory is more complicated and involves a
broader set ofvariables. These are used first
to isolate a measure of the exogenous com-
ponent of monetary policy and then to “test”
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that the resulting measure doesnot confound
shocks that are non-monetary in origin. This
part of the story involves many assumptions.
Significantly researchers using a wide variety
ofplausible assumptions have reached the
conclusion that the data support the liquidity
effect view.
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Pagan and Robertson report calculations
that suggest the liquidity effect maybe smaller
in the l980s than before, To see this, first
consider Figure 5, whichdisplays the response
of the interest rate to an orthogonalized inno-
vation in nonborrowed reserves. The response
is based on what Pagan andRobertson call the
CP model of Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (1994). The underlying six-variable,
l4-Iag VARwas estimated using the period
1959:01 to 1991:10. The blue hnes are
90 percent confidence intervals computed by
the bootstrap method outlined in the Pagan
and Robertson article.3 Note the statistically
significant negative initial response of the
interest rate. A 1 percent rise in nonbonowed
reserves drives the funds rate downabout
15 basis points (annual rate) in the current
month, and 25 basis point in the next month.
The Pagan and Robertson observation canbe
seen by comparing Figure 5 with Figure 6,
which displays the interest rate response based
on a six-lag, six-variable CP model estimated
over the sample 1982:12 to l991:01.~This
impulse response function has the implication
that a 1 percent rise in nonborrowed reserves
leads to a contemporaneous rise of 1 basis
point in the funds rate, followed by relatively
small reductions of 3, 8 and 13 basis points
in the first, second and third months, respec-
tively after a shock. After that, the point
estimates in Figures 5 and 6are quite similar.
The other curves in Figure 6 enable one to
test the null hypothesis that the data from the
latersample are consistent with the model fit
to the whole sample. They define a 90 percent
bootstrap confidence interval, constructed
using the 14-lag VARmodel and its fitted
residuals estimated for the entire sample.
Note that the first two impulses lie outside
this confidence interval, so that the null
hypothesis is rejected.° This test suggests that
the reduction in the liquidity effect in the
l980s is more thanwhat one would expect
given that the l980s constitute a relatively
small sample of data.
The primary reason for the shift in the
impulse response function appears to lie in a
shift in the variance-covariance matrix ofthe
VAR disturbances. One way to see this is to
note that the biggest change in going fromthe
full sample to the short sample is in the esti-
mated impact effect ofan orthogonalized NBR
shock. That object is a direct function of the
variance-covariance matrix of the fitted dis-
turbances. (In particular, it is the 5,4element
in the lower triangularCholeski decomposition
ofthe variance-covariance matrix.)
Another way to see this is to consider
Figure 7. That reproduces the impulse
response functions reportedin Figures 5
and 6 for convenience. In addition, Figure 7
reports an impulse response function obtained
by combining the lagged coefficients from the
14-lag VAR fit to the period 1959:01-1991:10,
with the variance-covariance of the sub-set of
its fitted disturbances coveringthe period
l982:12-1991:l0.°
Note that the resulting impulse response
function resembles theone fit to the post-1982
data in that it implies a small liquidity effect.
Thus, in essence the statistical test reported
in the previous paragraph (and, presumably,
in Pagan and Robertson too) is a rejection of
the null hypothesis of constancy ofaparticular
function of the VARdisturbance variance-
covariance matrix.
The fact that the smaller liquidity
effect in the 1.980s reflects instability in the
estimated variance-covariance offitted dis-
turbances raises two questions. First, Pagan
and Robertson have emphasized that there is
“extensive ARCH in the VAR equations for
interest rates and money” But the procedure
Iused (following Pagan and Robertson) to
deduce that there is statistically significant
instability in the impulse response functions
assumes the disturbances are Lid. Under these
circumstances, one presumes that extensive
ARCH in the disturbances would greatly
increase the probability offalse rejections in
tests of the null hypothesis of no change in a
variance-covariance matrix. This is because
Thot is, I used rondom samples of
the fitted VAR disteahonces, together
with the estimated VAR and actual
US. data for the reqaired 14 initiol
conditions togenerote t,000 arttficitl
data sets of 388 observations each,
for all six variables in theVAR. In
each artfticial data set, I fit a 14~ag,
sixvaniable VAR and compaRed an
impulse-response function osing the
procedare andedying the compute-
tions for the paint estmates in
Figore 5. tet a,(k) doaote the i
th
month’s response of the interest
rate to a policy shack, 1,.~., 36,
on thek~ artificial data set, 1
.1000. then, for each cr,Ik)
was ordered from largest to smallest
The 50th and 950th elements are
reported as the top and bottom
carves in Figaro 5.
The logs lengths of the two models
correspond to the choices made by
Paganand Robernsaa. A six-lag
modelfor the long sample period
does not work well. The thing-Box
0-soatisfic at log 24 compoted or
the residuals for the inneresn rate
equation has a value of 43, with
significance level of] percent. Ihis
conrirced me that six lags is too
short for this sample. The 0-statis-
tic computed for the sir-lag VAR fit
to the past-] 982 sample did not
show any evidence of serial conrelo-
ton in the residuals.
The bootstrap confidence intervals
were campated asfollows. Using
US. data forthe required 14 initial
conditions, the empirically esttmaoed
14-lag VAR was used to simulate
1,000 artificial data sets of 388
observations each- The residuals
far earh data setwere obtained by
random sampling from the fitted
residuals. The last 107 abservatans
in each sample were used as the
estmatan period for hung a sin-lag
VAR and compufing an impulse
response fonctioa like the middle
(cornllnnued on following popeI
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* obtoined by combining logged VAR coefficients from VAR fit to ve4eole sample with
innovation vaniance-covarionce motrix from post-1982 period.
under ARCH, a sample variance-covariance
matrix can display substantial time variation,
even though the underlying unconditional
variance-covariance matrix is constant. Thus,
it remains an open question whether the
smaller estimated liquidity effect in the 1980s
is simply a statistical artifact.
Second, the apparent instability in the
variance-covariance matrix of VARdistur-
bances suggests it might be fruitful to explore
the possibility of policyshifts using the
“identified VAR”identification strategy pur-
sued by Bernanke (1986) and Sims (1986).
There are two reasons for this: (1) It is widely
thought that policy did change across the
1979-82 and 1982-present periods; and (2)
the Bernanke-Sims style approach would
predict a change in the variance-covariance
matrix of residuals under a change in policy
Whether it predicts precisely the instability
observed is an open question.7
CONCLUSION
To summarize, the authors draw attention
to a reduction in the estimated size of theliq-
uidity effect in the 1980s. This certainly
deserves attention. However, the right statis-
tical techniques have notyet been applied to
determine whether the apparent change is
statistically significant, or just an artifact of
the small number ofobservations. Assuming
(footnote S corntl
line in Figure 6. The confidence
intervals were competed using the
1,000 impulse response fonctiors
with the some method as the one
underlying Figure 5.
that is, let l’~” 4(L) Yr_r ±ea3
where ca~ nm the fitted VAR distur-
bances and 4(L) denotes the fitted
14-lag matrir polynomial of VAR
coefficients. let Vdenote the tall
rnce-cavaniance malrir of urrnvering
tho period 1982:12-1991:10 orly.
let CC’” Vbe the lower ttangelor
Chaleski decompositan of V. then,
the nombers in Figure 7 are the
coefficients in the 5,4 element of
the maRio polynomial (I _4(1)]•rC~
Another ioterestng question is
whether such an onalysis coold be
reconciled with dynamic macroeco-
nomic theory.
it is not astatistical artifact, it would be inter-
esting to investigate exactly what it means.
Does it reflect specification enor due to a
change in policy regime? Does it reflect that
the liquidity effect actually was smaller in
the 1980s, perhaps because agents became
moresensitive to news about inflation?
To assess the results in this article, it is
important to recall what is atstake here. Views
about the presence or absence ofaliquidity
effect in the data determine whatkind of
monetary models macroeconomists use to
conduct policy analysis. In earlymonetized
real business cycle models, the interest rate
money dynamics were dominated by strong
anticipated inflation effects. The Pagan-
Robertson article presents no evidence to
support the notion that there is astrong rise
in interest rates in response to an expansionary
monetary policy shock, as these models
require. Instead, all the point estimates indi-
cate a faIl in the interest rate in the wake of a
positive monetary policy shock. In particular,
the Pagan and Robertson article provides
no evidence that macroeconomists should
abandon models exhibiting liquidity effects
andgo backto simple monetized real business
cycle models.
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